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We analytically address disease outbreaks in large, random networks with heterogeneous infectiv-
ity and susceptibility. The transmissibility Tuv (the probability that infection of u causes infection
of v) depends on the infectivity of u and the susceptibility of v. Initially a single node is infected,
following which a large-scale epidemic may or may not occur. We use a generating function ap-
proach to study how heterogeneity affects the probability that an epidemic occurs and, if one occurs,
its attack rate (the fraction infected). For fixed average transmissibility, we find upper and lower
bounds on these. An epidemic is most likely if infectivity is homogeneous and least likely if the
variance of infectivity is maximized. Similarly, the attack rate is largest if susceptibility is homoge-
neous and smallest if the variance is maximized. We further show that heterogeneity in infectious
period is important, contrary to assumptions of previous studies. We confirm our theoretical pre-
dictions by simulation. Our results have implications for control strategy design and identification
of populations at higher risk from an epidemic.
The spread of infectious disease is a problem of great
interest [1]. Much work has focused on how diseases
spread in networks of human, animal, or computer in-
teractions [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. The transmissibility,
the probability that an edge transmits infection, has a
network-dependent threshold (which can be zero) corre-
sponding to a second order phase transistion above which
an epidemic may happen and below which epidemics are
not found. Ideally an intervention reduces the transmis-
sibility or modifies the network to raise the threshold so
that epidemics cannot occur. Most study has focused on
determining the threshold value under varying assump-
tions [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] in order to design an optimal
intervention.
For many diseases and networks, it is impractical to
reduce transmissibility sufficiently to eliminate the pos-
sibility of an epidemic. An intervention strategy should
therefore optimize competing goals: minimize social cost,
reduce the probability a large-scale epidemic occurs, and
reduce the attack rate (fraction infected) if an epidemic
does occur. Recently the probability and attack rate have
been investigated [2, 3, 4, 12, 13], but none of these has
systematically investigated the effect of heterogeneity in
transmissibilities. Heterogeneities can result from varia-
tions in the application of interventions or from natural
differences in the population such as variation in recovery
time. It is often assumed that this special case can be
mapped without loss of generality to recovery of all indi-
viduals after a single time step [4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14] and so
the number of new cases from a single case is distributed
binomially. However, it may be inferred from [15] that
this assumption is false. We have recently become aware
of independent work [16] which shows that recovery time
heterogeneity reduces the epidemic probability, but has
no effect on the attack rate. In this Letter, we consider
how generic heterogeneities affect the epidemic probabil-
ity and the attack rate if an epidemic occurs.
The epidemics we study spread on random networks of
N nodes with degree distribution given by P (k) where k
is the degree. We use the SIR model [1]: nodes are di-
vided into susceptible, infectious, and recovered classes.
We modify the model to include heterogeneities. An in-
fectious node u with infectivity Iu connected to a suscep-
tible node v with susceptibility Sv infects v with prob-
ability equal to the transmissibility Tuv(Iu,Sv) of the
edge. Infectious nodes recover and are no longer suscep-
tible. The outbreak begins with a single infection (the
index case) which spreads to neighboring nodes. If an
epidemic occurs, the eventual number infected is O(N),
otherwise the outbreak is localized. I and S can be quite
arbitrary, e.g., I may be a vector representing time of in-
fection, level of virus shedding, frequency of handwash-
ing, etc. The form of Tuv can also be quite general: it
need only be integrable and bounded in [0, 1].
The spread of an epidemic on a network with hetero-
geneous infectivity and susceptibility is equivalent to a
special case of directed percolation for which the prob-
ability of retaining an edge depends on both the base
and target node. In this formalism, infection spreads to
the out-component of the index case [2, 3]. If the dis-
ease has sufficiently high transmissibility a single giant
strongly connected component Gscc exists [17], occupy-
ing a fixed fraction of the network as N →∞. The set of
nodes not in Gscc, but from which Gscc can be reached
is denoted Gi, while the set of nodes not in Gscc but
reachable from Gscc is denoted Go [i for ‘in’ and o for
‘out’] as demonstrated in figure 1. If the index case is in
Gi ∪ Gscc an epidemic occurs, infecting all of Go ∪ Gscc
and very few other nodes. In the limit N →∞ the prob-
ability of an epidemic is the probability the index case is
in Gi ∪ Gscc and the attack rate is the fraction of nodes
in Go ∪ Gscc [23]. We use P and A to denote the limit-
ing epidemic probability and attack rate. In general the
sizes of Gi and Go may differ significantly so P 6= A.
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FIG. 1: Schematic representation of Gi, Gscc, and Go. All
nodes in Gscc can reach any other node in Gscc.
This contrasts with the case of homogeneous transmissi-
bility where the problem can be mapped to undirected
bond percolation [4, 18, 19] and P = A.
We develop a general theory to find P allowing both in-
fectivity and susceptibility to be heterogeneous. Generat-
ing function approaches [20] have been used to study dis-
ease spread both inside the body [21] or in society [3, 4].
We modify these approaches to calculate P based on
the distribution of I and S. Holding the average trans-
missibility fixed, we then use Jensen’s inequality to find
distributions which give upper and lower bounds on P .
Because Go and Gi interchange roles if edge directions
are reversed, A is calculated in the same manner. Our
predictions are confirmed through simulations on a large
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network.
Each node u has an infectivity Iu and a susceptibility
Su chosen from independent distributions given by P (Iu)
and P (Su). Given the infectivity Iu of u, the relation
Tuv(Iu,Sv), and the distribution P (S), we define the out-
transmissibility of u as
To(u) =
∫
Tuv(Iu,Sv)P (Sv) dSv . (1)
From (1) and the distribution P (I), we know the distri-
bution Po(To). We similarly define the in-transmissibility
Ti and its distribution Pi(Ti). Po and Pi must yield the
same average, but not all pairs Po and Pi with the same
average are consistent. For each Po there exists at least
one Pi and vice versa. Henceforth we consider just Pi
and Po, and do not use P (S) and P (I).
We choose the index case u0 uniformly from the pop-
ulation. We classify infected cases by their generation,
measuring the number of infectious contacts in the chain
between them and u0 (generation 0). We note that the
generation time need not be fixed: generations may over-
lap in time, changing the temporal dynamics but not af-
fecting our results.
Our class of random networks is defined by the Molloy–
Reed algorithm [22]. Short cycles are rare. The neighbor-
hood of u0 is tree-like on successively longer length-scales
as N →∞. Consequently, P equals the probability that
the transmission chains in an infinite tree are infinite.
We define a probability generating function f(x) for
the number of infected nodes in generation 1:
f(x) = p0 + p1x+ · · ·+ pjx
j + · · · ,
where pj is the probability that the index case directly
infects j neighbors. The index case has degree k with
probability P (k) and thus pj is given by
pj =
∞∑
k=j
P (k)
∫ 1
0
Bi(k, j, To)Po(To) dTo ,
where Bi(k, j, To) is the likelihood of j successful trials
from k attempts, each with probability To. Note that pj
depends on the distribution Po but not Pi.
In subsequent generations, the probability that a node
is infected is proportional to its degree. Early in the epi-
demic an infected node with degree k has k−1 susceptible
neighbors because the source of its infection cannot be re-
infected. As such the probability qj that this individual
infects j neighbors is
qj =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=j+1
kP (k)
∫ 1
0
Bi(k − 1, j, To)Po(To) dTo .
where 〈·〉 denotes the expected value. We let h(x) =∑
qjx
j be the generating function for the number of new
cases caused by a non-index case. The generating func-
tion for the number of infections caused by n non-index
cases is [h(x)]n. Consequently it may be shown that the
generating function for the number of infections in gen-
eration g > 0 is given by
f(hg−1(x)) ,
where hg−1 denotes composition of h with itself g − 1
times. For later use we rearrange f and h as
f(x) =
∫ 1
0
Po(To)
∞∑
k=0
[1 + To(x− 1)]
kP (k) dTo , (2)
h(x) =
∫ 1
0
Po(To)
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
[1 + To(x− 1)]
k−1kP (k) dTo . (3)
The extinction probability is limg→∞ f(h
g−1(0)). To
calculate this, we find limg→∞ h
g−1(0) which is a solution
to x = h(x). At most two solutions exist in the interval
[0, 1], one of which is x = 1. If no other solution exists
then x = 1 is a stable fixed point and P = 0. Otherwise
the iteration converges to x0 < 1 and
P = 1− f(x0) .
Because f and h are independent of Pi, P is unaffected
by heterogeneities in susceptibility.
We now seek distributions Po maximizing or minimiz-
ing P subject to 〈T 〉 = T ∗. In their investigation of
recovery time heterogeneities, [16] showed that the prob-
ability is maximized if recovery times are identical. We
generalize this to arbitrary sources of heterogeneities in
3infectivity, using a similar proof. For notational conve-
nience we use δ∗(T ) to denote the δ-function δ(T − T ∗),
set
hˆ(T, x) =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
[1 + T (x− 1)]k−1kP (k) ,
and rewrite (3) to explicitly show that h depends on Po
h[Po](x) =
∫ 1
0
hˆ(To, x)Po(To) dTo .
We similarly define f [Po](x). Because hˆ is a convex func-
tion of T , Jensen’s inequality shows Po = δ
∗ minimizes
h[Po](x). We denote the smallest root of x = h[δ
∗](x) by
x1. For x < x1 and any Po, we have x < h[δ
∗](x) ≤
h[Po](x). Thus the root x0 of x = h[Po](x) satisfies
x1 ≤ x0, so x0 is minimized if Po = δ
∗.
Similar calculations show f [δ∗] (x) ≤ f [Po](x) for all
Po. Further, f [δ
∗] (x) is an increasing function of x.
Thus the extinction probability f [Po](x0) is minimized
by Po = δ
∗. So homogeneous infectivity maximizes P .
In addition, we find a new lower bound. Jensen’s in-
equality also implies that fixing 〈T 〉 = T ∗ but increas-
ing
〈
T 2
〉
reduces P . Consequently, P is minimized by
Po(To) = (1− T
∗)δ(To) + T
∗δ(To − 1).
Thus we have shown that an epidemic is most likely
if To is homogeneous and least likely if its variance is
maximized. Analogously the attack rate is largest if Ti is
homogeneous, and smallest if its variance is maximized.
We expect that a threshold value of 〈T 〉 exists above
which epidemics can occur [x = h(x) has two roots] and
below which they cannot. Allowing 〈T 〉 to vary by con-
tinuously changing Po, the fixed point x = 1 of x = h(x)
bifurcates into two when h′(1) = 1. We find
h′(1) =
〈T 〉
〈
k2 − k
〉
〈k〉
.
So the epidemic threshold is 〈T 〉 = 〈k〉 /
〈
k2 − k
〉
, gener-
alizing the results of [3, 4].
We confirm our predictions by comparison with sim-
ulations on an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network with 100000 nodes
and 〈k〉 = 4. As N → ∞, Erdo˝s–Re´nyi networks with
fixed average degree have Poisson degree distribution and
h(x) = f(x) =
∫ 1
0
exp[〈k〉To(x− 1)]Po(To) dTo .
For our first comparison, we consider the effect of vary-
ing infection time. We discretize time, and take differ-
ent models of recovery time given in the caption of fig-
ure 2. For each time step, the probability of infecting
a susceptible neighbor is p, and so an infected individ-
ual with recovery time τ has To = 1 − (1 − p)
τ . As a
reference we consider the case where all infectious indi-
viduals recover after exactly five time steps. We vary p
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FIG. 2: Comparison of theory (lines) with simulation (sym-
bols). For the different distributions of infectivity (with sus-
ceptibility constant), P changes, but A does not. We use
constant recovery time τ = 5 (△), τ = 0 or∞ (♦), τ = 2 or 8
(), τ = 1 or 10 (◦), and finally a constant recovery rate (×).
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FIG. 3: Comparison of theory (curves) with simulation (sym-
bols) for Tuv = 1− exp(−αIuSv). The theoretical bounds are
in dashed bold. The distributions are ♦: P (I) = δ(I − 1),
P (S) = 0.5δ(S−0.001)+0.5δ(S−1); ×: P (I) = 0.5δ(I−0.3)+
0.5δ(I − 1), P (S) = 0.2δ(S − 0.1) + 0.8δ(S − 1); ◦: P (I) =
0.5δ(I−0.1)+0.5δ(I−1), P (S) = 0.2δ(S−0.1)+0.8δ(S−1);
: P (I) = 0.3δ(I − 0.001) + 0.7δ(I − 1), P (S) = δ(S − 1).
in order to change the average transmissiblity T ∗. The
fraction of nodes with each recovery time is chosen such
that
∑
P (τ)[1 − (1 − p)τ ] = 1− (1− p)5 = T ∗.
The results of several examples are shown in figure 2.
Each data point represents 10000 simulations. Away
from the epidemic threshold, there is a clear distinction
between an epidemic and a non-epidemic outbreak. For
definiteness, we define an epidemic to occur if over 500
nodes are infected. Theory and simulations are in good
agreement. The upper bound for epidemic probability is
realized by the case where all infections last exactly five
time steps. The lower bound is realized by the case where
some infections last forever and infect all neighbors, while
the rest recover before infecting anyone. Because suscep-
tibility is homogeneous, A does not vary.
For our second comparison we perform calculations for
systems with both I and S heterogeneous. We use the
same Erdo˝s–Re´nyi network, but assume that Tuv = 1 −
exp[−αIuSv] where the distributions of I and S are fixed
and α is varied to tune T ∗. We find good agreement
between theory and simulations in figure 3.
We have shown in this Letter that the effect of gen-
eral heterogeneity in infectivity and susceptibility on epi-
demic probability P and attack rate A can be accurately
4modeled using a generating function approach. We find
that P and A may differ substantially. We have further
shown that heterogeneity in recovery time has a signifi-
cant effect on P and cannot be ignored.
For fixed average transmissibility we have found upper
and lower bounds for both P and A. Further we have
found distributions realizing these bounds. For fixed av-
erage transmissibility, increasing the variance of Po de-
creases P and increasing the variance of Pi decreases A.
These results can be used to assist in designing control
strategies. For example, if choosing between a strategy
that reduces infectivity or susceptibility by half for all
of the population or one that reduces infectivity or sus-
ceptibility completely for half the population, it is bet-
ter to choose the latter. As another example, consider
a strategy which attempts to locate and isolate infect-
eds compared with a strategy which attempts to provide
susceptible individuals with protection. Both may be
affected by inability to reach everyone. The first strat-
egy has a heterogeneous impact on infectivity, while the
second strategy has a heterogeneous impact on suscepti-
bility. If the strategies have the same average impact on
T then the first reduces the probability of an epidemic
more while the second reduces its size more. Which strat-
egy is optimal depends on whether the outbreak is small
enough that an epidemic can be prevented.
Our results can also be used to identify populations
most at risk from epidemics. Populations with low ge-
netic diversity are already known to be at particularly
high risk from an outbreak because the lack of hetero-
geneity allows the transmissibility to be higher. However,
our results show that even for a fixed average transmis-
sibility, a population with lower genetic variation will be
more severely affected by a disease.
For heterogeneous infectivity but homogeneous suscep-
tibility, Newman [4] anticipated that A follows from the
formulae derived under the assumption of homogeneous
T . He did not address the effect on P . We have shown
that A is independent of heterogeneity in infectiousness,
and so for this special case the prediction is valid. How-
ever, it fails if susceptibility is also heterogeneous.
The theory developed here can be generalized in a
number of ways. Most simply, we can introduce edge
weights to represent some details of the contact between
u and v. The same theory will hold, but the calculation
of To and Ti as in (1) must incorporate the edge weight
distribution. We can also introduce correlations between
the distributions of I, S, and k in an individual without
significant theoretical difficulties, though the conclusions
may change. It is more complicated to introduce corre-
lations of I, S, or k between neighbors.
We have assumed that the network has few short cy-
cles. More realistic social network models incorporate
significant clustering. However, at high transmissibili-
ties, if any neighbors are infected, an epidemic is very
likely. P is close to the probability that the initial node
infects any neighbors and loops may be ignored. At low
transmissibilities loops are not traced out by the infection
and again may be neglected. Loops affect our results only
at intermediate transmissibilities. The generating func-
tion approach becomes difficult because even early in an
outbreak an infected node may have multiple infected
neighbors.
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